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1 Introduction.
In contrast to the global income tax, which levies one tax schedule on the sum of income
from all sources, the dual income tax levies separate tax schedules on income from labor
and capital. It combines a low proportional tax rate on capital income with a progressive
tax rate on other income, mostly labor income. The dual income tax was introduced in the
Nordic countries in the early 1990ies.1 Later Austria, Belgium, Iceland, Italy, Japan, and
Portugal have introduced tax systems that are similar to a dual income tax, with separate
tax schedules for labor income and interest income. As stated by Sørensen (1994), the
taxation of small businesses is the Achilles Heel of the dual income tax.2 For medium and
high income classes, there is a large di¤erence in the marginal tax rates on capital and
labor income, providing great incentives for income shifting from labor income to capital
income in order to minimize tax payments. Thus a system for imputing the return to
capital and labor in small businesses is required to counteract this kind of income shifting
and erosion of the tax base. The challenge is which imputation system to choose, and in
particular, how to set the imputation rate. This has previously been analyzed under two
related tax systems. Bond and Devereux (1995, 2003) show that under the allowance for
corporate equity tax system, the imputed rate of return to capital that insures investment
neutrality is the risk free nominal interest rate on government bonds. Panteghini (2001),
on the other hand, shows that the neutral imputation rate under the dual income tax
system must be higher when investments are irreversible, which is an argument in favor
of additional risk compensation in the imputation rate.
The Nordic countries have implemented di¤erent income splitting systems to impute
the return to labor and capital for small businesses. The present paper uses the Norwegian
imputation system as an example and analyzes how the dual income tax induces the sole
proprietor to participate in tax minimizing income shifting in the presence of technology
risk. It concludes that the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for high-income
self-employed individuals. The higher the business income of the self-employed and the
higher the di¤erence between the marginal tax rates on labor and capital, the larger is
the tax-minimizing incentive to incorporate. Real capital investments also serve as means
to shift income from the labor income tax base to the capital income tax base for the
high-income self-employed. The risk compensation under the split model is an investment
1The dual income tax was introduced in Sweden in 1991, Norway 1992, and Finnland 1993. The idea
originated in Denmark, and was implemented in their 1985 tax reform. Later they introduced a hybrid
system, mostly due to redistributive concerns. See Sørensen (1994, 1998) for more on the dual income tax.
2But, as Boadway (2004) states, the problem of dealing with personal business income is one that
plagues virtually every tax system.
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tax subsidy, and it counteracts the investment disincentives of the technology risk and
increases the investment level of the self-employed. The latter result formalizes the verbal
analysis of Hagen and Sørensen (1998), who argued that owners of sole proprietorships and
closely held corporations cannot diversify risk to the same extent that owners of widely
held corporations, and that they are risk averse. Hence sole proprietors and closely held
corporations might under-invest in risky capital compared with the social optima.3 Even
though the Norwegian variant of the dual income tax and the imputation system are used
as an example, the results and the discussion have relevance for other countries as well,
both the Nordic countries and other countries contemplating introducing the dual income
tax.
Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2004) present all the Nordic income splitting models and
analyze their e¤ects on the cost of capital of di¤erent types of rms in the absence of risk.
They concluded that the cost of capital is approximately the same for closely and widely
held corporations. The exception is debt nanced investments of closely held Norwegian
corporations, where the split model represents a tax subsidy. Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg
nevertheless ignore an important aspect in their analysis, namely the endogeneity of a
rms tax system: by changing organizational form the rm can experience a shift in the
taxes it faces. Most of the literature on tax e¤ects on the choice of organizational form is
based on U.S. data, where taxes discourage incorporation due to the double taxation of
dividends. Most papers conclude that even if the tax code provides incentives for smaller
corporations with high revenue to shift out of the corporate organizational form, this
e¤ect is rather small. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson
(1996), and MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) all conclude that non-tax factors seem to
dominate the choice of organizational form. The exception is Goolsbee (2004) who reports
large negative incentive e¤ects for incorporation under the U.S. tax code.
There has been little empirical research on of the dual income tax. One exception is
Fjærli and Lund (2001), who analyze how owners of corporations choose to pay wages and
dividends during a transit period to the dual income tax in Norway. They conclude that
owners pay themselves more wages than what is optimal from a short term tax minimizing
view, and suggest that this can be optimal from a long-term view, as wage payments are
the basis for future pension benets.4
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the tax system and provides
3Sandmo (1985), Apel and Södersten (1999), and Weisbach (2004) discuss in detail how taxes distort
investments in risky assets.
4Other authors have also studied e¤ects of the dual income tax on micro data. See for instance Aarbu
and Thoresen (2001), Fjærli (2004), and Thoresen (2004).
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empirical motivation. In section 3, the basic model is presented, and the choice of organiza-
tional form is limited to two forms; the entrepreneur can organize either as a self-employed
or as a widely held corporation. Section 4 and 5 analyze tax e¤ects on the entrepreneurs
investment behavior in the presence of technology risk under the two organizational forms,
and section 6 analyzes the tax e¤ects on his incentives to incorporate. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background.
2.1 The Norwegian imputation system - The split model.
The Norwegian split model applies to sole proprietorships and closely held corporations. A
corporation is dened as closely held if 2/3 or more of the shares are held by active owners,
where an owner is characterized as active if he works more than 300 hours annually in
the rm and passive otherwise. Spouses or under-aged children of active owners are not
recognized as passive owners. A corporation is dened as widely held if more than 1/3
of the shares are held by passive owners, and it is then taxed according to corporate tax
rules. Employers social security contributions of apply to all wage payments made by the
corporation.
Under the split model, an imputed return to the capital invested in the rm is calcu-
lated by multiplying the value of the capital assets by a xed rate of return on capital,
which is set annually by the Parliament on the basis of the average rate of return on
government bonds plus a risk premium. These assets include physical business capital,
acquired good-will and other intangible assets, business inventories, and credit extended
to customers net of debt to the rms suppliers. The imputed return to capital is taxed
at the corporate rate, which equals the capital income tax rate at the individual level.
Business prot net of imputed return to capital is the imputed return to labor, which is
taxed as labor income independent of whether the wages are actually paid to the owner or
not.5 Employerssocial security contribution does nevertheless not apply to the imputed
return to labor. If imputed labor income is negative, the loss does not o¤set other income,
but may be carried forward to be deducted against future imputed labor income in the
rm. The table in gure 3 in the appendix summarizes the most important parameters of
the Norwegian tax system.
5 If the rm has employees in addition to the owner(s), a salary deduction of a given percentage of the
wage bill from taxable wage payments applies before the return to the owners labor e¤ort is imputed. If
the imputed labor income exceeds a given threshold, the remainder is taxed as capital income.
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Figure 1: Number of sole proprietors and corporations over time.
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Figure 2: The value of rm specic capital of Norwegian self-employed individuals from
1992 to 2002, NOK, in 2002-prices.
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2.2 Empirical motivation.
An extensive income shifting through increased investments and changes of organizational
form seem to have taken place in the years after the 1992 introduction of the Norwegian
dual income tax. The total number of self-employed individuals in Norway decreased by
14 percent from 1993 to 2002, while the number of small corporations with four or less
employees increased by 16 percent. In 1994, 55 percent of new small corporations were
widely held, while this share had risen to 75 percent four years later. It is striking that
nearly the whole growth in the number of corporations comes as widely held corporations,
as is seen in gure 1. All this indicates that there might have been a change in preferred
organizational form as a result of creative tax-minimizing re-labelling activity, a point
emphasized by Gordon and Slemrod (2000). Unfortunately, the available data does not
allow us to trace the business entities as they change organizational forms.
There also seem to have been a response to the investment incentives under the split
model. The self-employed individuals with the 10 percent highest business income have
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increased their rm specic capital dramatically during the 1990ies, as we see in gure 2.
On average this group increased its real capital by 124 percent from 1992 to 2002, while
the corresponding increase for all self-employed was 68 percent.
Another indication of this income shifting is that while aggregated wages increased
by 44 percent from 1993 to 2002, aggregated business income of the self-employed only
increased by 26.5 percent. During the same period aggregated dividend receipts increased
by 299 percent.
3 The model.
For simplicity, the following analysis abstracts from many of the details discussed above.
Consider a utility maximizing entrepreneurial individual who lives for two periods and
who is about to start a business. He needs to decide how much to invest in real capital in
the rm, which has a stochastic second period return, as well as which organizational form
to choose. There are many non-tax factors that a¤ect the choice of organizational form,
as discussed by Ayers et. al (1996) and MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997), but in this
analysis we simplify by only including risk and taxes as motives behind this choice. As a
self-employed the individual is taxed under the split model. As a widely held corporation
he is subject to corporate tax rules, but is required to pay a part of dividends to passive
shareholders. The only reason for the individual to incorporate is to reduce his total tax
burden by escaping the split model. A closely held corporation would still be subject to the
split model, so in this context he has no incentive for choosing that organizational form.
Also, as Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2004) conclude in the absence of risk, the total
tax burden for the Norwegian sole proprietor is the same as for closely held corporations.
Assume thus that the alternative to being a self-employed is to organize as a widely
held corporation with the minimum required number of passive shareholders, (1   );
where 0 <  < 2=3 is the active owners maximum allowed share of ownership as a
widely held corporation. Individuals di¤er in their preferences of which is the preferred
organizational form. Here consider the marginal entrepreneur who initially has no intrinsic
value of either of the two organizational forms, self-employed and widely held corporation,
and who chooses the organizational form that maximizes his utility.
The individual has a given time endowment in both periods, which he spends working
in his rm and enjoying leisure. In order to study the individuals investment decision and
the choice of organizational form separately from his labor supply decision, assume that
total time spent working in the rm is given. The remaining leisure is hence also given. A
change of organizational form in order to reduce tax payments is only a re-labelling of the
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existing nature of the self-employeds activity, and he puts in the same amount of labor in
the two cases. But the change of organizational form could nevertheless change the return
to working, since it a¤ects the net return to entrepreneurial activity in the presence of
taxes.
Expected utility. The individuals expected utility function is represented by
EU = u(C1) + E [v (C2)] ; (1)
which has positive and decreasing marginal utilities of both rst period consumption, C1,
and second period consumption, C2; such that u0(C1) > 0; u00(C1) < 0; v0 (C2) > 0; and
v00 (C2) < 0: Assume that the individual has a precautionary saving motive, such that
v000(C2;s) > 0: See Sandmo (1970) and Kimball (1990) for more on precautionary saving.
The risk averse individual chooses the investment portfolio and organizational form that
maximize his expected lifetime utility.
Investments and income. In the rst period he has initial wealth Y; which he allocates
to investing in risky real capital K in the rm, and saving B in the nancial market.
Investments in the nancial market yield the exogenously given safe real rate of return r:
Savings may be negative, and then the individual borrows in the nancial market. Loans
are repaid in full in the second period. The gross return to real capital investments is the
sales income. The net of taxes sales income depends on the tax regime and thus on the
chosen organizational form. It will be specied separately for each organizational form in
the two following sections, as will the expressions for rst and second period consumption.
Real capital investments are in principle reversible, and are realized at the end of the second
period. The sales value of the real capital is the original value K net of the real capital
depreciation, which is represented by the shock-related depreciation rate e and discussed
more closely below. A high depreciation rate increases the degree of irreversibility in the
real capital investments and may work as a disincentive towards investments in the rm.
This is discussed more closely by Panteghini (2001).
The entrepreneur is the only person employed in the rm, and thus labor as a produc-
tion factor is xed. The rm produces one product, which is sold in the second period at
a given price set to unity, p = 1: The production level X varies according to the amount
of capital invested in the rm, and sales income is thus given by the production function
X = F (K), which has a positive and decreasing marginal product of capital; FK > 0 and
FKK < 0.
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Risk. The individual invests in real capital in the rst period, and he realizes all his
capital in the second period. The second period sales value of the capital stock of the rm
depends on the depreciation rate, which is given by the stochastic parameter e: There will
always be some depreciation, and the maximum loss through depreciation is the initial
value of the real capital, such that 0 < e < 1: The expected value of depreciation is
positive and given by the ordinary depreciation rate : E [e] =  > 0: The individual
demands a risk premium in order to invest in real capital in the rm. Dene  as the rate
of return to real capital required to compensate the individual for the relative expected
second period marginal utility reduction caused by the depreciation. The size of  depends
on two factors; the individuals preferences regarding risk, as well as the probability of a
technology shock that reduces the value of the existing real capital dramatically:
  E [v
0 (C2)  e]
E [v0 (C2)]
=  + ; (2)
where   cov [v0 (C2) ; e] =E [v0 (C2)] is the risk premium. A higher probability of a tech-
nology shock increases the expected depreciation rate . Also, the real capital depreciation
reduces the second period consumption. The more risk averse the individual is, the larger
is the utility loss from the drop in second period consumption. Thus the risk premium is
positive and higher the more risk averse the individual is.
Taxes. Let tw be the proportional tax rate on labor income and tk the proportional
tax rate on capital income. We simplify by assuming that the tax on labor income is
proportional, when in fact it is progressive in most countries, including the countries with
a dual income tax. But one might think of this tax as the top marginal tax rate on labor
income. The progressive labor income tax schedule is then in fact at on the top. Assume
that the tax rate on labor income is higher than that on capital income, tw > tk. Total
tax payments are given by T: No wealth tax is present in the model.
4 The self-employed.
Let the subscript "s" denote the previously described variables when the entrepreneur is a
self-employed. First period consumption is given as the initial wealth net of investments:
C1;s = Y  Ks  Bs: (3)
The self-employed owns the rm and has full disposal over total sales income. His gross
second period income consists of the return to his entrepreneurial investments, which are
the sales income F (Ks), as well as the return to his investments in the nancial market,
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[1 + r] Bs. Also, the real capital is capitalized in the second period, and the market value
is reduced by the stochastic depreciation: [1  e] Ks: Thus the second period income is
given by
C2;s = F (Ks) + [1  e] Ks + [1 + r] Bs   Ts: (4)
The imputation rate. The self-employed would, if he could and ceteris paribus, have
all income taxed as capital income. The tax authorities imputes a return to the real capital
in the rm. This xed imputation ri rate is the sum of the average return to government
bonds, r; and a risk compensation factor, ; such that
ri = r + : (5)
The residual of business income is the imputed return to labor, which is taxed as labor
income.
Tax payments and the individuals budget constraint. Capital income tax is paid
on the imputed return to capital, ri Ks. Labor income tax is paid on the imputed return
to labor, which is the value of the production net of production costs and the imputed
return to invested capital. In addition, capital income tax is paid on interest income from
the investments in bonds. Total taxes due for the self-employed are thus given by
Ts = tk  ri Ks + tw  fF (Ks)  e Ks   (r + ) Ksg+ tk  r Bs; (6)
and the second period after-tax income of the self-employed can be written as:
C2;s = [1  tw]  [F (Ks)  e Ks] (7)
+ f1 + (tw   tk)  rig Ks + [1 + (1  tk)  r] Bs:
The rst part of the right hand side of (7) represents the individuals net of taxes income
from his rm if all income were taxed as labor income. But the imputed return to capital is
actually taxed as capital income, which increases his net income by a fraction (tw   tk) of
total imputed return to capital. The larger the di¤erence between the marginal tax rates
on labor income and capital income, the more attractive it is to participate in income
shifting activities in order to have more of his income taxed as capital income. But this is
only relevant if in fact he pays labor income taxes. Thus assume that the expected imputed
return to labor is positive, such that F (Ks)     ri Ks > 0:
The investment portfolio. The self-employeds optimization problem is given by
max
Ks;Bs
EUs = u(C1;s) + E [v (C2;s)] ; (8)
where C1;s and C2;s are given by equations (3) and (7).
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Proposition 1 The split model counteracts the investment disincentive inherent in the
technology risk and induces the self-employed to increase his investments in real capital.
This e¤ect is stronger the higher the risk compensation rate under the split model is and
the greater the di¤erence between the tax rates on capital and labor is.
Proof. From the rst order conditions of (8) we nd the optimal investment condition:
FKs = r +  + s  
tw   tk
1  tw  : (9)
Since tw > tk then
tw tk
1 tw   > 0; and [FKs ]tw>tk < [FKs ]tw=tk ; which again means that
[Ks]tw>tk > [Ks]tw=tk ; due to FKsKs < 0:
The technology risk represents a disincentive to invest in real capital, and this dis-
incentive is higher the greater the degree of expected irreversibility in the investment,
measured by the expected depreciation rate : The e¤ect of this investment disincentive
on the self-employeds investments in real capital also depends on his attitudes towards
risk, represented by the risk premium s: The higher a risk premium the individual re-
quires, the less he invests in real capital when the degree of irreversibility increases. This
e¤ect is counteracted by the risk compensation factor, ; which isolated considered works
as a government subsidy on real capital investments. The total risk compensation under
the split model is the relative after tax risk compensation rate, tw tk1 tw  ; which depends
positively on the di¤erence in the marginal tax rates on labor and capital income. Even
if the risk compensation factor  is constant over time, a tax change will change the net
risk compensation, and thus also the investment incentives of the self-employed. The net
risk compensation is higher the greater the di¤erence between the two marginal tax rates,
and the higher the tax rate on labor income. The self-employed entrepreneur thus invests
more in real capital than he would in the absence of taxes.
Proposition 2 Increased tax on labor income increases the risk compensation under the
split model and can induce the self-employed to increase his investments in real capital.
The proof of proposition 2 is provided in the appendix.
A higher tax rate on labor income reduces the net-of-taxes labor income, which reduces
the incentives to invest in real capital such that the income e¤ect is negative. At the same
time the higher tax rate on labor income means that the private return to shifting income
from the labor income tax base to the capital income tax base increases. It also increases
the relative after tax risk compensation rate tw tk1 tw  ; making the individual more willing
to invest in risky rm specic real capital, such that the substitution e¤ect of the tax
increase is positive. Therefore, the increased tax on labor income induces the individual
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to increase his investments in rm specic real capital if the substitution e¤ect dominates
the income e¤ect.6 As labor supply is given in this model, there are no e¤ects on labor
supply from tax changes.
Proposition 3 An increase in the tax rate on capital income reduces the after-tax risk
compensation under the split model and induces the self-employeds to reduce his invest-
ments in real capital.
Proof. Comparative static analysis of the rst order conditions from the
maximization problem (8) yields @Ks@tk =  
n
[r+]Ks+rBs
1+(1 tk)r   r 
E[v0(C2;s)]
u00(C1;s)
o
 @Ks@Y +n
u00(C1;s) + [1 + (1  tk)  r]2  E [v00(C2;s)]
o
 E[v0(C2;s)]D . As long as cov [v00(C2;s); e] 
E [v0(C2;s)] < cov [v0(C2;s); e]  E [v00(C2;s)] then @Ks@Y > 0, and then @Ks@tk < 0:
When the capital income tax rate increases, the incentive to participate in any kind of
income shifting decreases, since the di¤erence between the two tax rates, tw tk; decreases,
as does the private gain from income shifting. Also, a higher tax rate on capital income
means a decreased net risk compensation rate under the split model, tw tk1 tw . Both factors
induce the self-employed to invest less in risky real capital in the rm. The higher the self-
employeds capital income is, the larger share of his total income is a¤ected by the tax
increase, and the more is his net income reduced.
The indirect utility function. The investment portfolio
h bKs; bBsi maximizes the self-
employeds expected utility. Thus his maximum achievable level of expected utility, dEU s,
is given by the indirect utility function:
dEU s = u( bC1;s) + E hv( bC2;s)i ; (10)
where bC1;s = Y   bKs   bBs andbC2;s = [1  tw]  hF ( bKs)  e  bKsi+ f1 + [tw   tk]  [r + ]g  bKs + [1 + (1  tk)  r]  bBs:
5 The widely held corporation.
The entrepreneur only incorporates in order to reduce tax payments and wants to keep
as much as possible of the business income. Thus assume that he holds the maximum
allowed amount of shares as a widely held corporation, such that   2=3: The full share
6No wealth tax is present in this model, and in this framework the presence of a wealth tax would not
alter the split-models distortions to the investment portfolio of the entrepreneur. Increased investments
in real capital mean reduced investments in nancial capital and do not increase the wealth tax liability.
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capital is spent on acquiring real capital in the rm, such that the active owner invests
the share  of total real capital, and the passive shareholders invest the rest. The passive
shareholder may diversify his investments to a larger extent than the active shareholder,
who invests both his capital and his labor e¤ort in the rm. Assume therefore that the
passive shareholder does not require a higher risk premium than the active shareholder in
order to invest in the rm.
All shareholders receive dividend payments as a return to their invested capital. The
shareholder majority, which here means the active owner, decides what wage to pay the ac-
tive owner as a compensation for his labor e¤ort, as well as how much to pay in dividends.
Since an additional employers social security contribution applies to all wage payments
made by the corporation, the total tax burden on labor income is higher under the cor-
porate tax regime than under the split model. At the present top marginal tax rates, the
active owner increases his after tax income by 57 percent by paying no wages and instead
paying all earnings as dividends, even though some part is paid to passive owners.7 Assume
thus that all prots are paid as dividends in the second period, of which the entrepreneur-
ial individual receives the share  and the passive shareholders (1  ).8 The widely held
corporation considered here is typically a smaller, often family owned corporation, whose
objective it is to maximize the utility of the active shareholder. This is in contrast to the
larger corporations listed on the stock exchange that usually are described in the optimal
tax literature, whose goal it is to maximize the stock value of the corporation.
In the following, use the same variables as previously described, with the subscript "l"
denoting the variables when the entrepreneur organizes as a widely held corporation.
First and second period consumption. First period consumption is given by
C1;l = Y    Kl  Bl: (11)
7$100 in gross wage payments generate labor income taxes of $55.3 at the top marginal tax rate. In
addition $14.1 are paid by the corporation in social security contributions, such that the active owner is left
with $30.6 in after-tax wages. If he on the other hand does not pay wages, the at corporate income tax of
28% applies on the $100 in increased prots. After paying the passive owners their one third of dividends,
the active owners after-tax dividend income is $48. As the labor income tax schedule is progressive, the
real life active owner might choose to pay himself some wages.
8The passive shareholders will then receive a share of any inframarginal returns to the active owners
labor e¤ort. But as the sole purpose of this activity is tax minimizing income shifting for the active owner,
this is unavoidable. One response to this is to have adult children or grandchildren as passive owners. The
active owner still avoids the split model and has all his income taxed as capital income, and the dividends
paid to passive owners is in fact a tax-excempt intergenerational transfer.
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No wages are paid, and thus the net sales income is dened as rm prots, which are taxed
at the corporate tax rate tk at rm level. All prots are distributed tax free to the owners,
of which the active shareholder receives . The rm specic real capital is capitalized in
the second period, and the sales value depends on the stochastic depreciation. In addition,
the entrepreneurial individual receives the net of taxes return to his investments in the
nancial market. His second period consumption is given by
C2;l =   [1  tk]  [F (Kl)  e Kl] +  Kl + [1 + (1  tk)  r] Bl: (12)
The optimal investment condition. The entrepreneurs optimization problem is
given by
max
Kl;Bl
EUl = u(C1;l) + E [v (C2;l)] ; (13)
where C1;l and C2;l are given by equations (11) and (12).
Proposition 4 The corporate tax code induces no direct distortion to the widely held
corporations investment decision. But capital income taxes have an indirect e¤ect through
the indiviudals required risk compensation.
Proof. The rst order conditions from the maximization problem (13) yield the optimal
investment condition:
FKl = r +  + l: (14)
The proof of the e¤ect of capital income taxes is lengthy and is presented in the appendix.
Real capital is invested in the rm until the value of the marginal product equals the
risk adjusted cost of capital. Everything else equal, the optimal level of real capital in the
widely held corporation is lower than in self-employment. This is due to the fact that the
corporation does not experience any risk compensation through the tax system, as the
self-employed does.
The more risk averse the entrepreneur, and the higher the expected depreciation rate,
the less real capital is invested in the rm. Taxes have an indirect e¤ect on the level of real
capital in the widely held corporation since only the risk premium is a¤ected through taxes.
A higher tax on capital income reduces the entrepreneurs total income, which induces him
to invest less in all types of capital, including rm specic real capital. Thus the income
e¤ect is negative. Nevertheless, he shares the risk of investing in rm specic real capital
with the passive owners, which might induce him to increase real capital investments
when the tax rate on capital goes up, such that the substitution e¤ect is positive. The tax
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increase leads to reduced investments in the corporation if the income e¤ect dominates the
substitution e¤ect. Labor income tax changes have no e¤ect on the investment behavior
of the rm, since no wages are paid.9
The indirect utility function. The indirect utility function of the individual when his
rm is organized as a widely held corporation is given by
dEU l = u( bC1;l) + E hv( bC2;l)i ; (15)
where bC1;l = Y     bKl   bBl andbC2;l =   [1  tk]  hF ( bKl)  e  bKli+   bKl + [1 + (1  tk)  r]  bBl:
6 When to incorporate?
Here, the only reason for the self-employed to incorporate is by assumption to reduce
tax payments. As a self-employed, the individual keeps 100 percent of the prots, and he
enjoys the investment subsidy under the split model. On the negative side, part of his
income is taxed as labor income at the higher tax rate, and he carries the whole risk of the
operation alone. As a widely held corporation, on the other hand, he may choose to pay
no wages, such that all income is taxed as capital income. He reduces his risk exposure by
sharing the risk of the operation with the passive owners, but he also has to pay the passive
owners their share (1   ) of dividend payments. Only if the self-employed has positive
imputed personal income has he incentives to incorporate. For simplicity, let the costs
of incorporating be zero. The self-employed incorporates if he achieves higher expected
utility as a widely held corporation:
Incorporate if dEU l  dEU s > 0: (16)
Consider the entrepreneur who is indi¤erent between the two organizational forms, such
that dEU l =dEU s: What e¤ect do changes in the tax parameters have in his incentives to
incorporate? Let us now study this by applying the envelope theorem.
Proposition 5 The incentive to incorporate is stronger the higher the tax rate on labor
income.
9 In the absence of risk, the optimal investment condition reduces to the Fisher condition, and tax
changes have no e¤ect on the investment decision in the widely held corporation.
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Proof. By di¤erentiating (16) we nd that
@(dEU l dEUs)
@tw
=
n
F ( bKs)  ri +  + bs  bKso
E
h
v( bC2;s)i : By assumption F ( bKs)   (ri + )  bKs > 0: Thus @(dEU l dEUs)@tw > 0 if F ( bKs)bKs  
(ri + ) > bs:
The optimal investment level in real capital for the self-employed, bKs; fully exhausts
the income shifting possibilities under the split model to minimize imputed return to labor
by increasing the real capital base. As long as the imputed return to labor income, net
of the risk premium, is positive, a higher tax rate on labor income induces the individual
to incorporate in order to minimize tax payments by avoiding the split model altogether.
And these incentives to incorporate are then stronger for the high-income entrepreneurs.
The factor working against this is the fact that the net risk compensation rate under the
split model actually increases when the labor income tax rate increases.
Proposition 6 A higher tax rate on capital income reduces the incentive to incorporate.
The reason for this is twofold. First, the overall incentive for participating in tax
minimizing income shifting decreases when the di¤erence between the marginal tax rates
on labor and capital is reduced by the higher tax rate on capital income. Second, all income
of the entrepreneur is a¤ected by the tax increase when he is organized as a widely held
corporation, while only part of the self-employeds income is a¤ected by the tax increase.
The proof of proposition 6 is presented in the appendix.
Proposition 7 The tax minimizing incentive to incorporate is weakened by an increase
in the risk compensation factor under the split model.
Proof. From (16) it follows that
@(dEU l dEUs)
@ =   [tw   tk]  bKs  E hv0( bC2;s)i < 0.
The imputed return to capital is higher the higher the imputation rate, and corre-
spondingly, the higher the risk compensation rate is. The increased risk compensation
rate thus reduces the imputed return to labor, which is the part of rm prots to be taxed
as labor income. Since a higher share of the sole-proprietors income now already is taxed
as capital income, this makes it less attractive to incorporate.
Proposition 8 A lower required share of passive owners in order to be classied as a
widely held corporation, (1  ), strengtens the incentive to incorporate.
Proof. From (16) it follows that
@(dEU l dEUs)
@ = [1  tk] 
n
F ( bKl)  (r +l)  bKlo 
E
h
v0( bC2;l)i > 0; since F ( bKl)  (r +l)  bKl = nF ( bKl)bKl   FKlo  bKl > 0:
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As a widely held corporation the entrepreneur has all his income taxed as capital
income, but he only gets to keep a share  of the prots generated in the rm. The part
(1  ) of dividends is paid to the passive owners, and the minimum limit of this share is
set by the tax code. The lower the required share of passive owners to be classied as a
widely held corporation, the more of rm specic prots taxed as capital income may the
self-employed keep, and this increases his incentive to incorporate. This e¤ect is greater
the lower the tax rate on capital income and the higher the net business income.
7 Conclusion.
The above analysis concluded that the split model, and in particular the risk compensation
factor in the imputation rate, can induce the self-employed to increase his investments in
real capital in the rm. Capital becomes a means to shift income from the labor income
tax base to the capital income tax base. The higher the value of his real capital, the greater
is the imputed return to capital, and the more of his business income is taxed as capital
income. The incentive to participate in this kind of income shifting is stronger the higher
the di¤erence between the two marginal tax rates and the higher the risk compensation rate
under the split model. All types of real capital have the same imputation rate regardless
of actual risk, and also regardless of whether the risk is systematic or unsystematic. It
is thus to be expected that the self-employed canalizes this tax induced investment into
less risky types of real capital in order to minimize his risk exposure. If the risk that the
self-employed faces is fully unsystematic, he ought in principle be able do diversify away
from it. Diversication restrictions due to liquidity constraints is an argument in favor of
such a risk compensation via the tax system. As is the irreversibility of the investments
that the technology risk represents. On the other hand, if the risk is fully systematic, there
is in principle no such justication for a tax subsidy to investments of the self-employed,
since all agents in the economy is exposed to the same risk.
In addition to increasing the capital stock there are several ways to increase the book
value of the capital in the rm, for instance by shifting from leased to owned premises
and machinery, by increasing stocks at the end of the year, by increasing and extending
customerstrade receivables at the end of the year, and by nancing private durable goods
in the rm. It can even be protable to borrow in the nancial market to invest in business
capital. Such debts are private and entitle the borrower to tax allowances against other
capital income. High-income self-employed individuals are subject to the top marginal tax
rate on imputed return to labor, and these are in particular expected to take advantage
of the income shifting possibilities through increasing their capital stock. And as we saw
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in gure 2, there are indications that this development has taken place.
Only to a certain extent can the self-employed use real capital investments to shift
income to the capital income tax base. The high-income entrepreneur thus has incentives
to avoid the split-model completely by becoming a widely held corporation. The analy-
sis showed that this tax minimizing incentive to incorporate is stronger the higher the
di¤erence between the marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income is, since
this increases the return to income shifting. But the larger the required share of passive
investors in order to be classied as widely held corporation is, the weaker are the in-
centives to incorporate. When the active owner substitutes dividend payments for wage
payments to himself, it means that he shares any inframarginal returns to his labor e¤ort
with the passive owners. One way to make the shareholders compensate for their share of
the inframarginal returns is initially to demand higher prices for the shares. He can also
avoid this prot sharing with passive owners in both legal and illegal ways. One example
of legal tax avoidance is to have grown children or grandchildren as passive owners, which
is allowed under the corporate tax code. Then any dividend payments to passive owners
is in fact a tax free intergenerational transfer. There are numerous examples of creative
tax evasion in order to avoid the split model. For instance, two dentists may be passive
owners in each others widely held corporations. They both pay the required one third
of dividends to passive owners, but since they have about the same income potential, the
rst dentist receives the same in dividends from the second dentist as she herself pays him.
Both are then left with their full business income taxed at the capital income tax rate. If
detected, this is ruled illegal.
Partly as a response to this income shifting activity of small businesses, a Norwegian
tax reform will take place in 2006, as described in Sørensen (2005). The main feature of
this reform is the introduction of a tax on income from shares on the individual level,
where an imputed normal return to the shares is tax-exempt. The imputation rate under
the income splitting model for self-employed will be reduced, as the risk compensation
element is removed, such that the imputation rate then will be the before-tax risk free
rate of return.
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Figure 3: Tax parameters in Norway, 1992-2003.
Corporate income tax 28 percent
Capital income and capital gains tax 28 percent
Dividend tax* 0
Employers' social security contributions** 14.1 percent
Labor income tax (top marginal tax rate)
excluding social security contributions*** 41 - 47.5 percent
Social security contributions, wage earners 7.8 percent
Social security contributions, self-employed 10.7 percent
Imputation rate under the split model*** 10 -16 percent
*  There was a dividend tax of 11 percent from September 2000 to December 2001.
**  Employers' social security contributions apply on all wage payments. But they do not apply to self-employed income.
*** Rates have varied over the period.
9 Appendix.
The full mathematical appendix is available from the author upon request.
9.1 Proofs.
9.1.1 Proof of proposition 2:
Proof. Comparative static analysis of the rst order conditions from the maximization
problem(8) yields
@Ks
@tw
=  
n
F (Ks) (r+)Ks
[1+(1 tk)r] + [1 + (1  tk)  r] 
E[v00(C2;s)e]
u00(C1;s) Ks
o
 @Ks@Y
+
u00(C1;s)+[1+(1 tk)r]2E[v00(C2;s)]
[1 tw]DE[v0(C2;s)] 
8>><>>:
[1  tw]2 Ks 
(
E [v00(C2;s)  e  e]  E [v0(C2;s)]
 E [v0(C2;s)  e]  E [v00(C2;s)  e]
)
  [1  tk]    E [v0(C2;s)]2
9>>=>>;
where D is positive10. The rst component of the tax e¤ect is the total income e¤ect,
which is negative if cov [v00(C2;s)  e; e]  E [v0(C2;s)] < cov [v0(C2;s); e]  E [v00(C2;s)  e],
since F (Ks)   (r + )  Ks > 0 , E[v
00(C2;s)e]
u00(C1;s) > 0; and
@Ks
@Y > 0 as long as
v000(C2;s) > 0: The second component is the substitution e¤ect, which is posi-
tive, since u
00(C1;s)+[1+(1 tk)r]2E[v00(C2;s)]
[1 tw]DE[v0(C2;s)] < 0 and cov [v
00(C2;s)  e; e]  E [v0(C2;s)] <
cov [v0(C2;s); e]  E [v00(C2;s)  e] : Thus @Ks@tw > 0 if the substitution e¤ect dominates the
income e¤ect.
10D =

u00(C1;s) + f1 + (1  tk)  rg2  E [v00(C2;s)]
	
8><>:
u00(C1;s) + [1  tw]  FKsKs  E [v0(C2;s)]
+A2  E [v00(C2;s)]  2 A  [1  tw]  E [v00(C2;s)  e]
+ [1  tw]2  E [v00(C2;s)  e  e]
9>=>; ;
and
A = [1 + [1  tk]  r] + [1  tw]  E[v
0(C2;s)e]
E[v0(C2;s)]
:
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9.1.2 Proof of the e¤ect of capital income taxes in proposition 4:
Proof. Comparative static analysis of the rst order conditions from the maximization
problem (13) yields K 0l(tk) =  
8<:
F (Kl)+rBl
1+(1 tk)r   r 
E[v0(C2;l)]
u00(C1;l)
+ Kl  [1 + (1  tk)  r]  E[v
00(C2;l)e]
u00(C1;l)
9=;  @Kl@Y
+ 
2[1 tk]Kl
HE[v0(C2;l)] 
n
u00(C1;l) + [1 + (1  tk)  r]2  E [v00(C2;l)]
o
(
E [v00(C2;l)  e  e]  E [v0(C2;l)]
 E [v0(C2;l)  e]  E [v00(C2;l)  e]
)
; where H is positive11. The rst component is
the total income e¤ect, which is negative as long as cov [v00(C2;l)  e; e]  E [v0(C2;l)] <
cov [v0(C2;l); e]E [v00(C2;l)  e] ; since then @Kl@Y > 0. The second component is the substition
e¤ect. Since
n
u00(C1;l) + [1 + (1  tk)  r]2  E [v00(C2;l)]
o
< 0 and 
2[1 tk]Kl
HE[v0(C2;l)] > 0; the sub-
stitution e¤ect is positve if E [v00(C2;l)  e  e] E [v0(C2;l)] E [v0(C2;l)  e] E [v00(C2;l)  e] <
0; which is equivalent to cov [v00(C2;l)  e; e] E [v0(C2;l)] < cov [v0(C2;l); e] E [v00(C2;l)  e] :
Thus, the increased tax on capital income increases (reduces) investments in rm specic
real capital if the substitution e¤ect dominates (is dominated by) the income e¤ect.
9.1.3 Proof of proposition 6:
Proof. From (16) it follows that
@(dEU l dEUs)
@tk
=  r 
n bBl  E hv0( bC2;l)i  bBs  E hv0( bC2;s)io
  
h
F ( bKl) l  bKli  E hv0( bC2;l)i + ri  bKs  E hv0( bC2;s)i : We know that bBl >bBs; since 1) the split model induces the sole proprietor to over-invest in rm-specic
real capital, such that bKl < bKs; and 2) the individual only investes the share 
of corporate real capital, such that he can invest more in nancial capital. Hence
 r 
n bBl  E hv0( bC2;l)i  bBs  E hv0( bC2;s)io < 0: From (14) we know that FKl   r = l;
such that F ( bKl) l  bKl = nF ( bKl)bKl + r   FKlo  bKl > 0; since the average return to capital
is higher that the marginal return to capital, F (
bKl)bKl > FKl ; due to FKlKl < 0: We also
know that ri  bKs  E hv0( bC2;s)i > 0: Unless the imputed return to capital is so high that
it dominates the rst two e¤ects, then we have that
@(dEU l dEUs)
@tk
< 0:
11H =

u00(C1;l) + [1 + (1  tk)  r]2  E [v00(C2;l)]
	   
8>><>>:
[1  tk]  FKlKl  E [v0(C2;l)] +   u00(C1;l)
+ G2  E [v00(C2;l)]
 2   G  [1  tk]  E [v00(C2;l)  e]
+  [1  tk]2  E [v00(C2;l)  e  e]
9>>=>>;
 2 
(
u00(C1;l) + [1 + (1  tk)  r] 
(
G  E [v00(C2;l)]
  [1  tk]  E [v00(C2;l)  e]
))2
and G = [1 + (1  tk)  r] + E[v
0(C2)e]
E[v0(C2)] :
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